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INTRODUCTION 
Abner Greene’s Against Obligation1 and Louis Michael Seidman’s On 
Constitutional Disobedience2 offer provocative, subversive, and frequently 
convincing arguments against wholesale fidelity to the Constitution. Greene 
makes the case that individuals, at times, have no duty to obey the Constitution 
as it has been interpreted and articulates a methodology for how the 
government should accommodate these legitimate acts of disobedience. 
Seidman, however, makes the case that we should abandon the “pernicious 
myth” that we are obligated to obey the Constitution at all.3 He argues that if 
the fiction of constitutional obedience was jettisoned altogether, the national 
discourse about the issues that divide us – like the legality of gun ownership, 
affirmative action, and same-sex marriage – would concern the merits of 
various approaches to governmental regulation of the issues.4 The discourse 
would not hover around the question of whether a particular governmental 
regulation comports with the mandates of the Constitution. The latter, existing 
discourse is useless and frequently counterproductive, according to Seidman, 
as it stymies “the open-ended and unfettered dialogue that is the hallmark of a 
free society.”5 
This Essay asks a simple, but important, question: What will happen to 
abortion access in an era of constitutional infidelity? Will women continue to 
be able to terminate unwanted pregnancies if there is no obligation to follow 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law; Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston University. 
J.D., Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Columbia University Department of Anthropology.  
1 ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012). 
2 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
3 Id. at 9. 
4 See id. 
5 Id. at 10. 
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the dictates of the Constitution? How one answers the question may determine 
whether Greene’s and Seidman’s visions of constitutional defiance should be 
advocated, pursued, and implemented. That is, if one believes that 
governments should not be able to compromise a woman’s ability to undergo 
an abortion procedure – even if a majority of citizens believe that no woman 
(or only some women, in certain circumstances) should be able to have an 
abortion – then one may find Greene’s and Seidman’s proposals unattractive. 
And quite terrifying. 
At the outset, I should note that many argue that, with respect to abortion 
rights, we already live in an era of constitutional infidelity. That is, many 
critics of the right to abortion assert that there is nothing in the Constitution 
that so much as implies that it is illegitimate for governments to regulate, and 
even proscribe, abortion.6 The Court in Roe v. Wade7 was just making stuff up, 
they say.8 Accordingly, every time that a federal court strikes down an abortion 
regulation as an infringement on an individual’s constitutional right to an 
abortion, it is not an act of obedience to the Constitution, but rather an act of 
disobedience to the Constitution insofar as the document allows states to 
reasonably regulate society, with the exception of a few choice areas that, 
through the Bill of Rights, have been exempted from this general maxim.9 
 
6 For a well-known example of the argument that the abortion right has no textual base in 
the Constitution and is not otherwise implied by the Constitution, see John Hart Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973) 
(“What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the 
language of the Constitution, the framers’ thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, 
any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation’s governmental 
structure.” (citation omitted)). 
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 Roe famously, or perhaps infamously, located the abortion right in a general right of 
privacy, the existence of which was not explicitly established by constitutional text, but 
rather was suggested by precedents that protected individuals against governmental 
intervention in various “private” aspects of an individual’s life. See id. at 152-53 (citing 
various cases for the proposition that there exists a “right of privacy” that protects activities 
“relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education” (citations omitted)). Critics argue not only that the Constitution does not provide 
for a “right of privacy,” Bruce Fein, Griswold v. Connecticut: Wayward Decision-Making in 
the Supreme Court, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 551, 554-55 (1989) (describing the reasoning in 
Griswold as “utterly incomprehensible” and discussing other legal theories independent of 
creating a constitutional right to privacy that would have accomplished the same result), but 
that even if the Constitution does offer some protection against governmental regulation of 
individuals’ private lives, access to abortion does not logically fall within the umbrella of 
that protection, see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I have difficulty 
in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of ‘privacy’ is involved in this case. Texas, 
by the statute here challenged, bars the performance of a medical abortion by a licensed 
physician on a plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is 
not ‘private’ in the ordinary usage of that word.”). 
9 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that rational basis review 
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Moreover, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,10 
which affirmed the “central holding” of Roe,11 did little better than Roe in the 
way of convincing naysayers that the Constitution provides for an individual 
abortion right.12 Instead of plumbing the depths of constitutional text or 
endeavoring to divine the Framers’ original meaning or intent in using the 
phrase “due process of law,” Casey fretted over stare decisis.13 It is not unfair 
to argue that the Court seemed more concerned with what would happen to the 
perception of the Court’s legitimacy if it overturned Roe than with whether 
Roe was correctly decided in the first place.14 
Nevertheless, at present, we have an abortion right that, by hook or crook, 
enjoys some level of constitutional protection.15 As a result, women have 
 
is the proper test for determining whether a law regulating abortion is constitutional and, as 
such, stating that courts need only ask the question they ask with respect to all “social and 
economic legislation” – that is, whether the law “has a rational relation to a valid state 
objective”).  
10 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
11 Id. at 879. 
12 See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. 
Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 106 
(2005) (“Had the plurality treated seriously some of the other ‘prudential and pragmatic’ 
questions it enumerated, however, they would have had an ample basis for overruling Roe 
[when deciding Casey].”). 
13 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-61 (discussing whether Roe should be upheld under the 
principle of stare decisis). 
14 Id. at 869 (“A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing 
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and 
unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule 
of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we 
do so today.”). Interestingly, Seidman cites the doctrine of stare decisis as proof that we 
already live in an era of constitutional infidelity:  
In the vast majority of these opinions [in which the Court analyzes whether a prior case 
should be upheld under the principle of stare decisis], the justices spend little or no 
effort examining constitutional text and history. Instead, the justices parse their own 
prior decisions. They do so because it is usually these decisions, rather than the 
Constitution itself, that will determine the outcome of the case. 
SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 85. 
15 I describe the abortion right as having “some level” of constitutional protection 
because it is unclear where the undue burden standard falls within the tiers of strict scrutiny, 
intermediate review, and rational basis review. When the abortion right was first articulated 
in Roe, it was clear that the Court conceived of it as a fundamental right. Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Moreover, consistent with its approach to fundamental rights, the 
Court explained that courts should use strict scrutiny when reviewing abortion regulations 
and uphold such laws only if the state articulated a compelling interest supporting the 
regulation. See id. at 163 (finding that “[w]ith respect to the State’s important and legitimate 
interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical 
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester” and that “[w]ith respect to the 
State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at 
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access to legal abortion, and those adult women16 with the ability to pay17 can 
terminate an unwanted pregnancy before viability. The question, then, is: What 
if we accepted Seidman’s and Greene’s arguments that we really do not have a 
duty to obey the Constitution? Would women still be able to terminate 
pregnancies that they no longer wish to carry? 
I. SEIDMAN-STYLE CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 
In the current era of constitutional obedience, a state law prohibiting 
abortions would likely face immediate challenge, and a court would review the 
law in order to determine its constitutionality. In an era of Seidman-style 
 
viability”). The trimester framework was the result of different state interests becoming 
compelling at different times during pregnancy. 
Casey, however, replaced the trimester framework with the undue burden standard. See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (stating that the undue burden standard was the test that courts 
should use going forward when reviewing abortion regulations). One thing that is crystal 
clear about the test is that it is not strict scrutiny. Id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden 
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”). The 
question, then, is whether the undue burden standard is closer to intermediate scrutiny or 
whether it is no more than a gussied-up rational basis review. See Alan Brownstein, How 
Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 867, 881, 917 (1994) (explaining that the Casey plurality’s use of the undue 
burden standard amounted to rational basis review and highlighting similarities in the 
Court’s language when applying the undue burden or rational basis standards in other types 
of cases); Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to 
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 382 (2008) (stating that the Carhart Court actually used 
rational basis review while claiming to use the undue burden standard). It is worth noting 
that if, as some argue, the undue burden test is just a species of rational basis review, then 
the abortion right is no more of a “right” than our “right” to enter into a contract with our 
employers. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (using rational 
basis review to uphold a law that interfered with the ability of parties to contract). 
16 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515-17 (1990) (holding that 
requiring minors to prove they are mature and informed before being allowed to obtain an 
abortion does not violate their due process rights and that parental consent requirements for 
abortions are constitutional as long as there is a judicial bypass procedure); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (upholding parental consent 
requirements for minors seeking an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) 
(holding that states may implement parental consent requirements for minors seeking 
abortions so long as there is a an alternate procedure through which the minor may also 
obtain consent if the parents disagree).  
17 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding the funding restrictions 
placed on abortions by the Hyde Amendment and holding that a state is not obligated to pay 
for abortions that are not funded due to these restrictions, even if the abortions are medically 
necessary); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1977) (holding that a state’s participation 
in the Medicaid program does not obligate that state to fund non-medically necessary 
abortions). 
 2013] ABORTION ACCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL INFIDELITY 1301 
 
constitutional disobedience, however, it is unclear what would happen if the 
same law was passed and its legality was challenged. This uncertainty results 
from the fact that, in an era of Seidman-style constitutional disobedience, 
Marbury v. Madison18 would not necessarily be binding precedent and, as a 
consequence, it would be an open question whether courts would retain the 
power of judicial review.19 Seidman does not conjecture an answer about the 
status of judicial review in an era of constitutional disobedience: 
In the absence of constitutional obligation, the decision whether to have 
judicial review of this sort would, itself, be grounded in extra-
constitutional considerations. I have no idea how the struggle over the 
Court’s functions would ultimately be resolved, but at least the argument 
would be an honest one about what the Court actually does and what is 
actually at stake.20 
Accordingly, it is possible that these “extra-constitutional considerations” 
would lead to the eradication of judicial review. If so, the hypothetical state 
law prohibiting abortion would not be subject to challenge in the courts. 
Perhaps a new mechanism would be erected by which Congress, the President, 
or an administrative agency would have the power to review a state law and 
strike it down if appropriate. Perhaps no mechanism of review would be 
erected, and it would impossible for an external body to review a state law 
once it has been enacted; only a majority of voters could remove a problematic 
law – by voting to have it repealed. 
It is also imaginable that “extra-constitutional considerations” would lead to 
the maintenance of judicial review. The people could decide that it was in their 
best interest that “an elite, deliberative, and reason-giving body should have a 
check on the political branches.”21 Importantly, the people would make the 
decision to give courts the power to check the political branches with the 
knowledge that these courts were not interpreting the Constitution, but rather 
were decreeing the legality or illegality of laws based on other “extra-
constitutional considerations.” 
And what would these “extra-constitutional considerations” be? 
Frighteningly, they could be anything. Seidman explains: 
Courts exercising this review would presumably resort to some sort of 
more general principles to decide the cases before them. Perhaps the 
judges would begin with a presumption favoring individual liberty or, 
alternatively, with a presumption favoring democratic decision making. 
Perhaps they would resort to Kantian or utilitarian theories. Perhaps they 
would even refer to biblical teachings.22 
 
18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
19 See id. at 173-80. 
20 SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 129. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 130. 
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Those who are fond of abortion rights may find unappetizing a system in 
which a woman’s ability to determine whether or not she will become a mother 
– and thus, her ability to determine the trajectory of her life – turns on a court 
that may be guided by biblical teachings. Also unappetizing, but probably less 
so, is a system in which a woman’s access to abortion depends on a court that 
favors democratic decisionmaking; those who are fond of abortion rights 
characterize access to abortion as a right precisely because doing so removes 
the question of abortion access from democratic decisionmaking.23 
Furthermore, it is not obvious that abortion rights would fare much better when 
contingent on a court that favors Kant, Bentham, or some undefined and open-
ended notion of individual liberty. And, of course, this problem of “extra-
constitutional considerations” that would determine the legality or illegality of 
abortion laws is not unique to courts and judicial review; it is also present if the 
power to review laws resides in Congress, in the executive branch, or with the 
voters in a jurisdiction. 
Seidman argues that this system – one in which the propriety of all laws, 
including abortion regulations, is determined by extra-constitutional 
considerations of all varieties – is preferable to the current system, in which the 
propriety of laws is determined by resort to constitutional argumentation. He 
bases this preference in something he calls “contestability theory,” or the 
tendency of a system moored in extra-constitutional considerations to keep 
political dialogue going.24 Simply stated, when a person argues that the 
hypothetical abortion prohibition is good law because it is consistent with 
biblical teachings, another will argue that it is bad law because it is 
inconsistent with a theory of individual liberty. When this naysayer makes his 
point, another will then pipe up and contend that, according to an alternate 
theory of individual liberty, the abortion prohibition is actually good law. At 
which point, another will join the dialogue and make the case that the abortion 
prohibition is bad law because it is inconsistent with Kantian ethics. In 
Seidman’s view, the conversation would continue until the propriety of 
abortion access is settled: 
Precisely because we all have a stake in maintaining a political 
community, our disputes are likely to be resolved one way or the other. 
Ultimately, our willingness to reach resolution depends upon our capacity 
 
23 Notably, Seidman doubts that abortion rights in the current era of constitutional 
fidelity actually remove the question of abortion access from democratic decisionmaking. 
He argues that the contours of the abortion right as fashioned by the Court closely follow the 
majority’s opinions about when and for whom abortion should be available. See id. at 33 
(“In some of the circumstances where majorities do not favor the [abortion] right – for 
example, in cases of poor women who seek state-funded abortions, young women who want 
abortions without the consent of their parents, or women who need late-term abortion 
procedures – the Court has restricted the right.”).  
24 Id. at 136-37. 
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for compromise, for transcending self-interest for the benefit of the 
common good, and for empathic connection to our political opponents.25 
Those who favor abortion rights might find this scenario unappealing. For 
those who believe that abortion access is a tool that a woman must wield in 
order for her to determine her life course and the quality thereof, a system in 
which the availability of this tool hinges on a national conversation is 
unpalatable. Essentially, proponents of abortion rights do not trust political 
dialogue to lead to the “right” answer to the question of whether a woman 
should carry the pregnancy to term; instead, they trust women to arrive at their 
own, personal right answer to the question of whether they should carry a 
pregnancy to term.26 
II. GREENE-STYLE CONSTITUTIONAL NONOBLIGATION 
Unlike Seidman, Greene does not advocate throwing established precedent, 
and the Constitution generally, out the window. Rather, he offers a theory of 
the Constitution that requires the accommodation of those who would prefer to 
live their lives in a way that is inconsistent with the way the majority would 
have them live. 
It becomes obvious fairly quickly, however, that Greene’s proposal, if 
followed, would have the practical effect of throwing out established precedent 
as it relates to abortion rights. Greene argues that no one, including state and 
local officials, is obliged to follow the Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.27 Thus, although the Court in Roe interpreted the Constitution to 
provide a woman with the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, and 
although the Court affirmed that decision in Casey, all manner of 
governmental actors can disagree with that interpretation. Accordingly, within 
Greene’s proposal, it is legitimate for an official or lawmaking body to pass a 
law prohibiting abortions in a jurisdiction as long as it argues that its own 
independent review of the Constitution, contrary to the Court’s review of the 
document, revealed it as containing no prohibition on the law at issue.28 The 
 
25 Id. at 138. 
26 It is possible that even in the current era of constitutional obedience, judges are relying 
on these “extra-constitutional considerations” when they determine the constitutionality of 
abortion regulations. That is, when the majority in Roe looked to precedent, found a right to 
privacy, and determined that this right was broad enough to encompass the abortion 
decision, it may have been motivated by extra-constitutional considerations such as 
utilitarianism or some notion of individual liberty. Similarly, when Justice Rehnquist argued 
in his dissent that the Constitution did not contain a fundamental right to privacy, he may 
have been motivated by extra-constitutional considerations like biblical teachings or Kantian 
ethics. Thus, the “pernicious myth” of constitutional obligation forces the obfuscation of the 
actual motivations behind decisions. 
27 GREENE, supra note 1, at 239-47.  
28 Greene writes that officials should take into consideration a number of factors when 
deciding whether to follow the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. See id. at 223-28 
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Court retains the power to strike down the prohibition, of course, 
understanding the law as an “interpretive challenge.”29 Greene writes that such 
laws would “awaken the Court to its fallibility and, according to the strength of 
the challenge, lead the Court to be more (or less) willing to reexamine its 
doctrine.”30 
There should be no doubt that, if Greene’s proposal were accepted, the 
Court would face “interpretive challenges” to Roe and Casey often – perhaps 
every term.31 Even if the Court reaffirmed the decisions subsequent to every 
challenge, however, it would be hard to describe the state of affairs as one in 
which women’s abortion rights were protected. Once the abortion prohibition 
 
(arguing that officials should consider coordination and stability among officials, the level 
of consensus within the Court, factors distinguishing cases, the persuasiveness of the 
Court’s reasoning, generational participation in debating the issues, and officials’ positional 
duties). Interestingly, many of the considerations that he itemizes do not support a fidelity to 
the Court’s abortion precedent. He asserts that officials ought to obey precedent if 
disobeying it means upsetting an established regulatory structure, id. at 223; disobeying Roe 
and Casey, however, does not threaten governmental stability. He further conjectures: 
Perhaps an official should adhere to constitutional principle announced by a 9-0 Court 
vote more readily than she should a 5-4 one, and perhaps she should be more apt to 
follow an opinion quickly adhered to across the country than one to which popular (and 
official) resistance has been present from issuance.  
Id. at 223-24. The fact that Casey managed to garner only a plurality of Justices, coupled 
with the fact that Roe was hardly “quickly adhered to across the country,” suggests that an 
official need not find themselves tethered to the opinions. 
Greene also asserts that an official might not disobey an opinion that he finds persuasive. 
Id. at 224 (“In deciding whether to challenge Court precedent, government officials should 
consider the soundness of the Court’s reasoning in the relevant case(s), as judged by 
standard interpretive norms.”). Suffice it to say that an official who believes that abortion is 
a religious or moral wrong would probably not find his or her hands stayed by the soundness 
of the Court’s reasoning in either Roe or Casey. 
29 Id. at 248.  
30 Id. 
31 There are political groups whose entire purpose is to see the Court overturn Roe. See, 
e.g., Why End Roe, ENDROE.ORG, http://www.endroe.org/home.aspx (last visited May 16, 
2013). Legal scholars who support the anti-choice movement take issue with the Roe 
Court’s constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, A Legal Strategy to 
Overturn Roe v. Wade After Webster: Some Lessons from Lincoln, 1991 BYU L. REV. 519, 
531-34 (arguing that Roe overlooks an unborn child’s constitutional right to life); Raymond 
B. Marcin, God’s Littlest Children and the Right to Live: The Case for a Positivist Pro-Life 
Overturning of Roe, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 38, 38-39 (2008) (arguing that the 
Court should overturn Roe using anti-choice reasoning because that approach is stronger 
than a federalism-based strategy). There are even those who support a woman’s right to 
choose whether to end her pregnancy, but who disagree with the reasoning in Roe. See, e.g., 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198-1200 
(1992) (asserting that, had the Court simply based its striking down of abortion restrictions 
in Roe on theories of equal protection, the decision would not have been subjected to 
extreme controversy and criticism to the extent that it has been). 
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passed, women in a jurisdiction would be without abortion access until the law 
was challenged and the Court granted certiorari, heard the case, and issued its 
decision.32 Abortion rights advocates would hardly find this alternate state of 
affairs preferable to the current one. 
But, perhaps Greene’s proposal would be more attractive to abortion rights 
proponents if we imagine an alternate world in which Roe and Casey have 
been overturned33 and a jurisdiction has passed a law prohibiting abortions 
altogether or limiting access to them to a small number of circumstances. In 
this world, Greene would allow individual women to seek exemptions from the 
regulation through the judiciary.34 In order to be exempted from the law, a 
woman would have to claim that the law’s application to her would burden the 
exercise of her religion or force her to violate a deeply held “comprehensive 
view”35 founded in some other normative authority, whether it be 
“philosophical, cultural, family-based, etc.”36 Should the woman make a prima 
facie showing for an exemption to the abortion ban, the government could 
resist granting the exemption by showing that it has a compelling state interest 
in enforcing the ban despite the woman’s normative convictions.37 
Greene’s proposal is attractive insofar as it allows for the possibility of 
women accessing abortion should Roe and Casey be overturned. The 
likelihood of women actually accessing abortion, however, would be 
frighteningly low; moreover, the burdens that they would have to face in order 
 
32 Of course, challengers could seek a temporary injunction of the law while the case 
wended its way to the Court. Lower courts, however – which, like state and local officials in 
Greene’s proposal, do not have an obligation to follow Court precedent – would determine 
whether or not to enjoin the law. Just as it is not unrealistic to believe that states would 
challenge Roe and Casey if released from the yoke of obedience to Court precedent, it is not 
unrealistic to believe that many lower courts would choose not to enjoin abortion 
prohibitions.  
33 It is worth noting that Greene does not advocate fidelity to Roe and Casey as a matter 
of course, simply because they are precedent and women have relied on the decisions. See 
GREENE, supra note 1, at 192 (“[I]f Roe and Casey were wrongly decided, that the 
government could now protect fetal life and women might no longer have access to legal 
abortions would be a correct state of affairs, and the resulting systemic costs would be 
acceptable ones. If Roe and Casey are to be maintained, it should be on the merits, not 
because they are extant precedent.”). But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people 
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of 
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event 
that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.”). 
34 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 116.  
35 Id. at 129. 
36 Id. at 117. 
37 See id. at 118.  
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to gain that access would be exceedingly high. To begin, individual women 
would have to plead for exemptions to judges on a case-by-case basis.38 
Judges, then, would determine whether they believe the woman when she says 
that being compelled to abide by the abortion prohibition – that is, being 
compelled to bear a child – would violate some religious or other normative 
conviction.39 It may suffice to say that it is hard to imagine that many women 
would be successful in convincing anyone that a religious or normative 
conviction would be burdened by carrying a pregnancy to term. Moreover, 
even if judges believed that such a conviction existed, they would have the 
latitude to decide that, although the conviction might be violated by the 
abortion ban, the conviction is not central to the woman or the violation is not 
substantial.40 The scenario is eerily reminiscent of the pre-Roe era, when 
women had to plead for abortions from panels of doctors who were 
empowered to determine whether her abortion was actually “medically 
necessary.”41 Simply put, forcing a woman to try to convince someone that an 
abortion is in her best interests demeans her and denies her decisionmaking 
capacity.42 
Even if a woman convinced a judge of her sincerity and made a prima facie 
case for an exemption, a state could argue that it has a compelling interest in 
nevertheless applying the law to the woman. Greene does not offer a theory of 
how courts should determine whether or not the state’s asserted interest is 
compelling. Thus, if his proposal were to be accepted, judges would 
experience the same problems they do now with respect to deciding whether an 
interest is weighty enough to justify infringing an individual liberty.43 
Demonstrating the enduring nature of this problem, Greene uses an example of 
religious observers who would like to engage in the ritual slaughter of animals 
 
38 Id. at 130-32 (describing the requirement of “case-by-case judicial balancing”).  
39 Id. at 129-30 (observing that courts may justifiably inquire into the sincerity of the 
belief of a person asking for an exemption to a law). 
40 Id. at 130-31 (stating that “there’s no reason . . . that centrality should not be part of 
the inquiry into the nature and significance of the burden” and that courts should “inquire 
into whether there’s a substantial burden” on the individual’s norms). 
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-40 (1973).  
42 See id. at 153 (explaining physical and psychological harms that may befall a woman 
if she is not allowed to choose whether or not to end her pregnancy).  
43 See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition That “Life Begins at 
Conception,” 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 603-04 (1991) (“On the whole, however, the 
compelling state interest doctrine remains an unstructured balancing test in which our 
constitutional guarantees may always give way to raisons d’état.”); see also T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 976 (1987) 
(arguing that Justice Blackmun’s defense in Roe of viability as the point at which the state’s 
interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling “is a definition of viability, not an 
explanation of value”); Ely, supra note 6, at 924 (“Exactly why [viability] is the magic 
moment is not made clear . . . . [T]he Court’s defense seems to mistake a definition for a 
syllogism.”). 
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and who seek an exemption from a law requiring that all animals be stunned 
prior to their killing.44 Should the state’s interest in protecting animals from 
cruelty – and from dying unnecessarily painful deaths – trump the religious 
observers’ interest in practicing their religion in the manner they believe it 
ought to be practiced? He writes: “The case involving animal slaughter is 
harder because we have to determine how to assess the interest in animal 
welfare . . . . [T]here is a legitimate debate about the extent to which we must 
consider animal welfare on a par with human welfare.”45 He ultimately 
suggests that the state’s interest in animal welfare is not compelling and that 
the exemption should be granted: 
Exempting ritual slaughter from the stunning rules is a plausible way of 
finding a middle ground between two claims of right – the claim on 
behalf of the animals and the claim from religious truth. For those of us 
who aren’t sure about either claim (in part because we’re neither non-
human animals nor devout Jews or Muslims), the rule-plus-exemption 
approach makes sense.46 
But, what about fetuses? Just as “we have to determine how to assess the 
interest in animal welfare” in Greene’s example, a judge would have to 
determine how to assess the interest in fetal welfare. And just as “there is a 
legitimate debate about the extent to which we must consider animal welfare 
on a par with human welfare,” there is a legitimate debate about the extent to 
which we must consider fetal welfare on a par with the welfare of human 
beings capable of living independently of and externally to another human 
being. Perhaps the difference between the example of animal slaughter and the 
issue of abortion is that, while advocates of animal rights might admit that 
there is some ambiguity to their claim as compared to the claim of religious 
observers, advocates of fetal rights tend to express absolute conviction that 
fetal interests should in most, if not all, cases trump the interests of women 
bearing unwanted pregnancies. Moreover, the reverse is true of advocates of 
women’s reproductive rights. Thus, the likelihood that opponents and 
supporters of abortion would agree to a “middle ground” – in which there is a 
rule prohibiting abortion, but exemptions are allowed for individual women 
who make convincing arguments about their need to have their normative 
convictions honored – is low. 
CONCLUSION 
Seidman concludes his analysis with the observation that perhaps the 
illusion of obligation to the Constitution is necessary to keep the country from 
spiraling into anarchy; perhaps it is necessary to keep the country united.47 He 
 
44 GREENE, supra note 1, at 127. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 143. 
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hopes not, however, writing: “We cannot know for sure until we give 
constitutional disobedience a try. And that is reason enough to make the 
effort.”48 But, as the above analysis reveals, an era of constitutional infidelity 
would likely substantially reduce the level of abortion access that adult women 
with the ability to pay enjoy in our present era of constitutional fidelity. For 
those who believe that abortion access is paramount in ensuring that women 
are able to participate in society as equals, the fact that constitutional infidelity 
may render this access impossible may be reason enough to resist giving it a 
try. 
 
 
48 Id. 
